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Decided on June 8, 2021
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Gavin Wisdom, Petitioner,
against
Joy Byfield and Joshua Popo, Respondents.

10083/2021

For Petitioner: Alana Glaubiger

For Respondent: Joy Byfield, pro se and Joshua Popo, pro se
Jack Stoller, J.
Gavin Wisdom, the petitioner in this proceeding ("Petitioner"), commenced this
proceeding against Joy Byfield ("Respondent") and Joshua Popo ("Co-Respondent"), the
respondents in this proceeding (collectively, "Respondents"), by a petition filed on May 17,
2021 seeking a judgment against Respondent on the allegation that Respondent illegally
www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_50526.htm
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locked him out of 1131 Bergen Street, Apt. 7, Brooklyn, New York ("the subject premises")
on March 5, 2021, and seeking a judgment against Co-Respondent on the ground that CoRespondent newly occupies the subject premises that Petitioner is entitled to occupy.
Respondent interposed an answer with a general denial. The Court held a trial of this matter
on June 4, 2021 and June 7, 2021.

The trial
Petitioner testified that he moved into the subject premises in August of 2020 with his
son; that Respondent gave him possession of a room; that he paid rent to Respondent in a
monthly amount of $800 that Respondent then reduced to $700; that he last paid rent on
February 1; that Respondent changed the locks on multiple occasions, first on February 26,
2021; that he has had baby paraphernalia in the subject premises; that when he was locked out
he was in a hotel and then a friend's house; and that it is not safe for him to go back to the
subject premises.
Petitioner testified on cross-examination that his son lived in the subject premises shortly
after he started living there; that Respondent did not ask him not to bring a child to the subject
premises; that he did not move out shortly after moving in August of 2020; that he was doing
a job in another state; that someone who works for the trucking company he works for came
to pick up his property; that he did not seek a return of his deposit; that Respondent told him
that she did not want problems and that she would give him his deposit back; that it is not true
that he [*2]moved out and moved back in; that Respondent only gave him one key and the
door has two locks; that police were called; that he did not get Respondent's permission to
remove locks from her door; that he did not sign a lease; that he has mail coming to the
subject premises; that he does not have a mailbox key; and that he knows about mail because
someone drops mail on the floor.
Petitioner testified in response to the Court's questioning that his room was the first
bedroom on the right when one enters the subject premises.
Respondent introduced into evidence a text she sent Petitioner on November 11 saying
that she rented him a room and that she did not want him there anymore
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Respondent testified that Petitioner moved into the subject premises; that Petitioner paid
her a deposit of $1800; that she did not hear from him; that she sent him a text thinking that
he moved out; that Petitioner called her and said that he works a trucking job; that she tried to
give Respondent's deposit back to him; that she was told that his friend would pick up
Respondent's property; that she had money problems; that she did not feel comfortable with
Petitioner moving back in; that when Petitioner moved back in, Petitioner said he was
divorcing his wife; that she felt uncomfortable when Petitioner's family was there because of
COVID; that Petitioner does not have keys for the top lock; that Petitioner engaged in
objectionable conduct that gave her problems with her landlord; that Petitioner changed the
lock to her door; that she has not seen Petitioner for months; that April 20 was when she
heard from him; and that she called police for harassment.
On the Court's questioning, Respondent testified that she has lived in the subject
premises for ten years; that she has a lease; and that Co-Respondent moved into same room
that Petitioner had been previously living in on April 19, 2021.
Respondent testified on cross-examination that she rented a room to Petitioner; that she
collected rent from Petitioner; that she did not change the locks; that Petitioner changed the
locks first and she changed the locks afterward; that Petitioner was told where the key was;
and that she was willing to let him back in but Petitioner did not come for the key.

Discussion
In order to demonstrate the standing necessary to obtain a judgment in a lockout
proceeding, Petitioner must prove that he was in possession of the subject premises. While
the address on the petition is the entirety of an apartment, Petitioner did not have exclusive
possession of the entire apartment, which is what distinguishes a tenancy from a license.
Layton v. A. I. Namm & Sons, Inc., 275 A.D. 246, 249 (1st Dept. 1949), aff'd, 302 NY 720,
722 (1951). See Munro v. Godfrey Prescott & NYC Dept. of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 2002
NY Misc. LEXIS 851, 4-5 (Civ. Ct. Bronx Co. 2002), citing Kaypar Corp. v. Fosterport
Realty Corp., 1 Misc 2d 469, 470-471 (S. Ct. Bronx Co.), aff'd, 272 A.D. 878 (1st Dept.
1947)(a licensor does not surrender his or her right to occupy the premises). A licensee
normally does not have the standing to obtain a judgment in a lockout proceeding. World
Evangelization Church v. Devoe St. Baptist Church, 27 Misc 3d 141(A)(App. Term 2nd Dept.
www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_50526.htm
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2010), Brown v. 165 Conover Assoc., 5 Misc 3d 128(A)(App. Term 2nd Dept. 2004), Korelis
v. Fass, 26 Misc 3d 133(A)(App. Term 1st Dept. 2010). See Jimenez v. 1171 Wash. Ave, LLC,
2020 NY Slip Op. 50615(U)(Civ. Ct. Bronx Co.)(the enactment of RPAPL §768 does not
confer upon licensees the standing to obtain a judgment in a lockout proceeding). But See
Salazar v. Core Servs. Grp., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op. 50424(U), ¶ 3 (Civ. Ct. Bronx Co.)(the
enactment of RPAPL §768 does [*3]confer upon licensees the standing to obtain a judgment

in a lockout proceeding).[FN1] Petitioner cannot obtain possession of the subject premises,
when defined by the petition as the entire apartment.
Be that as it may, the record does show that Respondent rented a bedroom to Petitioner,
which could arguably confer exclusive possession of at least that room to Petitioner.
Petitioner did not move to amend the petition to conform to the proof at trial, but the Court
retains the discretion to sua sponte amend the pleadings to conform to the proof in the
absence of prejudice to the party who would oppose the amendment. Murray v. New York, 43
NY2d 400, 405 (1977), Matter of Jada W. (Ketanya B.), 104 AD3d 861 (2nd Dept.), leave to
appeal denied, 21 NY3d 862 (2013), Groves v. State Univ. of NY, 265 AD2d 141, 145 (3rd
Dept. 2000). Assuming arguendo that the Court were to so amend the pleadings, Petitioner's
possession of his room, together with the proof that Respondent changed the locks and
withheld a key to one of the two locks to the subject premises can comprise proof of the
elements of a lockout cause of action. Compare West Broadway Glass Co. v. Namaskaar of
Soho, Inc., 11 Misc 3d 144(A)(App. Term 1st Dept. 2006).
When a tenant otherwise proves the elements of a lockout cause of action, restoration
may not be appropriate under circumstances where it would be futile because an eventual
eviction of the tenant would be inevitable. Soukouna v. 365 Canal Corp., 48 AD3d 359 (1st
Dept. 2008), Bernstein v. Rozenbaum, 20 Misc 3d 138(A)(App. Term 2nd Dept. 2008).
Assuming arguendo that the Court would deem Petitioner to have possession of the bedroom
in the subject premises pursuant to a subtenancy of Respondent, which is tantamount to a
tenancy for these purposes, IBM v. Joseph Stevens & Co., L.P., 300 AD2d 222, 223 (1st Dept.
2002), Respondent is still the tenant of record of the subject premises with no written
sublease with Petitioner. As Petitioner has occupied the subject premises for less than a year,
Respondent could terminate a subtenancy for no reason on thirty days' notice. RPL §§226c(2)(b), 232-a.
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However, as of this writing, New York and the world are enduring the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Finding that evictions and homelessness hinder the advancement of
public health, the Legislature has effectuated stays of evictions by the COVID-19 Emergency
Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2019. Excusing eviction by self-help on the
ground that restoration would be futile would contravene this policy. Tangiyev v. Telt, 2021
NY Slip Op. 50373(U)(Civ. Ct. Kings Co.).
Unlike the petitioner in Tangiyev, supra, however, Petitioner does not seek restoration to
an apartment that he possesses exclusively, but an apartment that he would be sharing with
Respondent. To the extent that COVID-19 can be spread in indoor settings, the concern that
Respondent expressed about living with Petitioner is legitimate; Respondent would have no
say about whatever Petitioner may do that may give rise to risk factors to her. Moreover, the
extent that Respondent can only be restored to the subject premises if the Court grants
Respondent's application for a judgment and warrant against Co-Respondent would nullify
any public health benefit of preventing an eviction.
Accordingly, for the above stated reasons, the Court dismisses this proceeding after trial

This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.

Dated: June 8, 2021

New York, New York

HON JACK STOLLER

J.H.C.
Footnotes
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Footnote l:Qian "Llily" Zhu v. Xiao "Joy" Hong Li, 70 Misc 3d 139(A)(App. Term 2nd
Dept.), decided after the enactment ofRPAPL §768, holds that a licensee cannot maintain a
lockout proceeding.
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